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DESCARTES, SAUSSURE, AND THE 
PROBLEMS OE INTEGRATING VOICE 
INTO A DUAL1ST1C UNIVERSE 
he distinction of the physical and the mental is the most characteristic feature of 
the Cartesian philosophy. This is especially significant in the context of the ratio-
nalist theory of the subject-centered innate ideas which provides the ontological founda-
tion for our knowledge of the material universe. In addition, because the causes of the 
generation and the corruption of things do not confine to their own unique and indi-
vidual forms or essences, to wit, to their own unique and individual principles, the form-
lessness of the things in the material universe made the modern science possible. In oppo-
sition to the Aristotelian tradition material things lost their autopoietic features in seven-
teenth-century rationalist philosophy. The material universe can be perfectly known in the 
inferiority of the intellect. Nothing happens outside the mental which could not be 
known in advance through and constituted architectonically in the intellect. 
The distinction of the physical and the mental, however, seems to pose an insoluble 
problem for uttering, communicating, or speaking on our knowledge of the material uni-
verse as well as the operation of our own intellect. The problem which arises from 
Descartes's philosophy is the gulf between two aspects of the reality, namely, thinking and 
speaking. Thinking on something belongs to the mental and speaking of thinking on 
something belongs to the modes of the physical state of the body, shortly, to the physical. 
Besides, Descartes attributed so different properties to the physical and the mental that 
no interaction can take place between them. In spite of Descartes's explanation put for-
ward, for instance, in Le discours de la méthode, the distinction of the physical and the men-
tal paradoxically does not allow us „to use words, or put together other signs in order to 
declare our thoughts to others". We are not able to communicate and understand ideas 
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by virtue of the exteriority of mind, to wit, language. The meaning of the speaker's 
thoughts can never be unfolded in or transmitted by the materiality of speaking, writing, 
or gesturing. Briefly, speaking as a mode of the physical state of the body can not act upon 
the intellect. The mind's action on the body and the body's action on the mind, of course, 
involve different considerations. The latter, however, was completely ruled out in 
Descartes's philosophy. There can not be a transfer of ideas between the interlocutors. 
Therefore, no possibility is left for the involvement of language in the formation, correc-
tion and modification of thinking on something. Since the two great groups of the phys-
ical and the mental can not be isomorphic my words can never bring or actualize ideas 
into or in the mind of others. Without recalling and actualizing the idea of something 
beforehand in the intellect this something is never just there as a product of sensory 
encounter with the abundant configuration of the material world. For this reason, to inte-
grate voices into the dualistic universe is very problematic. The more speaking unfolds the 
true ontological foundation of the universe, the more it vanishes into silence. 
Even if speaking as a basic constitutive element of knowledge and knowledge-forma-
tion on our external and internal worlds does not enjoy any distinguished status in the 
Cartesian philosophy, it remains an ontological problem for philosophers for centuries 
after Descartes. However, Descartes and the Cartesians — especially, Malebranche, 
Cordemoy, Bayle, Leibniz, Geulincx and others — managed to find a proper place for the 
connection of language and thought within the theological framework of the rationalist 
philosophy. To quote a few examples, „Only God is our immediate and external subject, 
we see everything through Him", „God is the only bond of our association", „we com-
municate with each other through God", and so forth. In the last resort, God is the only 
guarantee of giving true utterance to the internal and external worlds in the intersubjec-
tivity of language. 
Therefore, Descartes's metaphysical distinction of the physical and the mental has not 
necessarily caused any profound theoretical dilemma until the role of God in the creation 
and the continuous preservation of the universe goes without saying. Descartes, the 
Cartesians and, in general, seventeenth-century natural philosophers (especially, Galileo 
and Newton) successfully substituted the rational and active God — who „is the only bond 
of our association" — for the Platonic demiurge, or Abraham's and Jacob's anthropomor-
phic God. All of the interface problems between the physical and the mental, and conse-
quently, thinking and speaking comes from the secularization of the physical-metaphysi-
cal worldview of the Cartesian philosophy. In the course of time, the Cartesian distinc-
tion lost its very essence, namely, the role of God, who is „the author of all the motions 
in the world" and „also the author of all our actions"1, meanwhile the prophanized ver-
sion of the Cartesian distinction persists in its original frame of reference, a dualistic uni-
verse and tries to explain the interaction between the physical and the mental by means 
of either exalting the external world at the cost of the internal one or vice versa, or dimin-
ishing their ontological differences without questioning the very sense of the distinction. 
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My point is that after vanishing the role of the philosophers's God from the physical-
metaphysical worldview of seventeenth-century natural philosophy the original frame of 
reference, to wit, the notion of a dualistic universe where the physical and the mental are 
respectively considered as primary, or as mutually conditional of and interacting with each 
other as distinct substances is untenable. 
If we choose, for instance, the external world as the primary reference of our knowl-
edge and statements we can not rid ourselves of the need of some clarification of the 
degree of our knowledge and the truth-value of our statements about the external world. 
It can not be said that, on the one hand, the external world is obvious and, on the other 
hand, our knowledge and statements about it are contingent without knowing the clear 
criteria in advance of what rests on its obviousness and their contingencies. If we insist 
upon the belief that some interaction really takes place between two distinct substances, 
the physical and the mental, language and thought, for instance, in conversations (with-
out the ceaseless assistance of God) we should give a reason for the lack of the manifesta-
tion of causality, linearity and locality in its very processes. The causal relation between 
language and thought assumes an isomorphic system. It reflects the conventional view 
that language is a denotative symbolic system for the transmission of ideas. In this case, 
two distinct substances are independent of each other but Geulincx's well-known clock-
maker is desperately needed in order to set and guarantee the rule of the correspondence 
between the physical and the mental parts of reality. I would like to underline again that 
a conclusive argument for an isomorphic language-thought relationship in Descartes's phi-
losophy or following Descartes's is still lacking. 
Following Saussure sophisticated and enigmatic description about the principles of 
linguistics in Cours de linguistique générale, linearity as 'the natural communicative stance' 
is pictorially sketched in many current textbooks and essays concerning language and com-
munication. But, these pictures can iperely offer the common sense conviction, or rather 
a crude approximation to the act of speech in which the string of thoughts and of speech 
supposed to be related in a linear sequential order to each other. Many aspects of lan-
guage-thought relationship rather show entirely different ordering, however, the supposi-
tion of a more abstract ordering, instead of linearity, makes the causality and locality prin-
ciples quite unsettled, too._In general, to comprehend and to express something do not 
involve the necessity of a linear-sequential order either in the cognitive or the linguistic 
domains of the speaking and thinking subjects. One of the striking counterexamples of 
the notion of linearity is James Joyce's Finnegans Wake where the text shows itself as a net-
work of traces, „with signifiers spilling over into one another".2 Anyway, all the texts as 
well as the textuality of the world are the networks of traces whose different unfoldings 
reflect the thinking and speaking subjects's personal orientations in their own linguistic-
cognitive domains. It must be said that linearity is, at most, the speaking and thinking sub-
jects's conventional and cooperative description about their own communicative actions, 
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in other words, a particular case of ordering but beyond that does not disclose any onto-
logical property of what the language-thought interaction is it like. 
Locality mainly relates to the interface problem, or using the language of the medieval 
theology, where the transsubstantiation of the physical and the mental, to wit, linguistic 
signs and ideas comes to pass in the process of the language-thought interaction. As a con-
sequence of the distinct ontological characterization of the physical and the mental, it is 
difficult to imagine the process of interaction in which their two opposite attributes, for 
instance, locality and non-locality can be equally conceived. To sum up, it is hard to find 
ontologically compelling arguments for upholding the interactionist belief without the 
clarification of its required and closely connected concepts as causality, linearity and local-
ity. 
The Cartesian philosophy made a strong impact on the modern theories of language 
even if Descartes himself had little to say about it. Many twentieth-century schools of the 
linguistic philosophy insist upon the Cartesian distinction of the physical and the mental 
and place emphasis on the priority of the latter. Therefore linguistic analyses frequently 
aim at the reconstruction of the intellect or explain the language structure on the basis of 
the primary constitution of the intellect as its ontological foundation. The „mentalist the-
orists" of meaning frequently express their hope, as Frege articulated it, that the unfold-
ing of the true and real ontological foundation of language „might put an end to the rule 
of the words over man's intellect".31 think that this feature of the rationalist philosophi-
cal tradition and its ontological claim concerning the priority of the mental over the phys-
ical aspect of speaking rather make language entirely redundant and almost impossible 
than disclose the nature of the language-thought relationship. This view merely allows us 
to imagine language as a connotative system which orients the speaking subject in his/her 
own cognitive domain without taking the intersubjective nature of the communicative 
interaction into consideration. In other words, the language-thought process becomes a 
secular and phenomenal first-person problem without the transcendental dimension of 
the absolute subject.4 
Saussure's approach towards language is a very elegant and productive, but in my view 
it remains inside the worldview of the Cartesian philosophy. Generally speaking, Saussure 
shifted a bit the original Cartesian distinction to the direction of the mental which, at the 
same time, does not belong to an absolute, transcendental subject. In Saussure's theory 
the split can be localized between the concept and the acoustic image, in other words, the 
acoustic image as some kind of inner language was rescued from the material sphere and 
integrated into the mental one. The core of the problems in linguistics consists of the con-
cept-acoustic image structure constituted by signs in the inferiority of the subject, howev-
er, the acoustic-auditive phenomena of language as the material part are not its primary 
consideration. The latter is merely proximate to the inner language therefore there is not 
the connection between langue (the concept-acoustic image) and the acoustic-auditive lan-
guage. 
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I do not venture to say that I know the right answer to the above-mentioned problems. 
However, I would like to emphasize that any feasible attempt to overcome the interface 
problems between the physical and the mental should be based on an entirely different 
ontological interpretation of reality. First of all, the primary ontological claim about the 
existence of two distinct substances should be critically discussed so that we could account 
for the creative aspects of language in the formation, correction and modification of our 
knowledge upon the universe as well as its ability of expressing it. Briefly speaking, after 
vanishing the role of God from the physical-metaphysical worldview of the rationalist phi-
losophy, its original frame of reference, to wit, a dualistic universe should be also replaced. 
The distinction of the physical and the mental is, of course, a powerfull and attractive 
scientific conceptualization of reality which fairly well explains all of the mechanical phe-
nomena in the framework of the Cartesian grid and brings them into accord with the 
explicate order of the universe, especially, if we do not let the problems of time, space, 
continuity, interaction, the condition of the individualization of things, the cause of loco-
motion, locality, change, force and so forth to bother the basic tenets of our original con-
ceptualization. However, the attribution of the independent existences to the various sets 
of reality outside our analysis becomes the limitation of our understanding about the real-
ity, as well. Heisenberg so vividly described this situation in his Physics and Philosophy: „If 
one follows the great difficulty which even eminent scientists like Einstein had in under-
standing and accepting the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, one can trace 
the roots of this difficulty to the Cartesian partition. This partition has penetrated deeply 
into the human mind during the tree centuries following Descartes and it will take a long 
time for it to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality."5 
This different attitude, what Heisenberg pointed to, was formulated in Bohr's com-
plementarity conception. According to this conception there is no place for distict sub-
stances as ontological entities and their exclusive properties but only for processes in the 
unbroken whole of reality. The distinction of the physical and the mental rather origi-
nates from the fact of giving „too much emphasis to the analytic side of our thought 
processes". Beyond that distinction, the physical and the mental without having real and 
distinct ontological features „are only aspects that serve as terms for our analysis".6 The 
conceptualization of the language-thought process by means of the inscription of our ana-
lytic terms into it can, of course, contribute to our understanding of the particular sets of 
reality and productively serve certain limited purposes, as well. However, it does not give 
reason to suppose that, on the one hand, there is such a thing as language, and, on the 
other, there is such a thing as thought which interact to each other in a dualistic universe.7 
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